The Neo-Cartesian Revival: A Response by Harrison, Peter
The Neo-Cartesian 
Revival: A Response 
Peter Harrison 
Bond University 
Editors' Note: The following is Professor 
Harrison's response to Professor Evelyn 
Pluhar's article "Arguing Away Suffering: 
The Neo-Cartesian Revival," which appeared 
in the preceding number of Between the 
Species. Professor Pluhar's reply follows. 
Several corrections of errors, for which the 
editors are responsible, are to be made to 
"Arguing Away Suffering." See ''Errata'' on 
page 92 of this number. 
Let me begin by saying that I am grateful to 
Professor Pluhar for having drawn my attention to some 
possible sources of confusion in my original paper and 
for pointing out where further clarification is required. 
In view of space limitations I will not deal with all of 
her criticisms seriatim but will consider major points 
of contention under five headings: 
I. The Moral Implications of Animal Pain 
2. Mental States and the Relevance of Physical 
Similarities 
3. Sensation and Consciousness 
4. Free Will and Determinism 
5. The Relevance of Evolutionary Theory 
'This will be followed by some general remarks about 
my overall argument. I will not be restating my original 
case in any detail, but given that it is not presented in 
its best light in the preceding article, readers may wish 
to consult it for tllemselves. 
1. The Moral Implications of Animal Pain 
Perhaps the most serious misconception in Professor 
PIuhar's paper is her contention that ifPeter Carruthers 
and I have our way, "scientists might as well return to 
the practice of nailing research animals to boards for 
vivisection without benefit of anaesthesia." The 
implication is that from assumed facts about animaIs-
that tlley do not feel pain, for example---certain moral 
consequences directly follow. However, to arrive at 
conclusions about how animals ought to be treated, we 
must be anned with more than facts. l Some moral theory 
must come into play. Indeed one's view of morality will 
determine which facts are morally relevant. For those 
who subscribe to some crude form of utilitarianism, 
according to which tlle morality of acts is judged by 
whetller tlley conduce overall to physical pleasures or 
pains, putative facts about animal pain may well be tlle 
sole determinant of how animals ought to be treated. It 
might follow, for such utilitarians, that if animals do 
not feel pain, tllen there are no strictures on how they 
may be treated. However, for those who, like myself, 
subscribe to an alternative moral theory, animal pain is 
but one element among others. In my view there ,are 
moral considerations independent of the vexed question 
of animal pain which ought to govern our treatment of 
nonhumans. Thus, even if animals do not feel pain, it 
does not directly follow for those committed to some 
nonconsequentialist theory of ethics that we can treat 
animals how we wish.2 
The fact that the question of animal pain and the 
moral status ofanimals are distinct issues can be further 
illustrated by reference to the treatment of animals in 
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the seventeenth century. It is by no means clear, however 
frequently it may be asserted, that Descartes "had a 
profound effect on the practice of vivisection," The 
sources offered for this common view, ifany are offered 
at all, are usually those contemporary French writers 
who describe the gruesome experiments carried out by 
the Cartesians at Port-Royal.3 However there are equally 
compelling counter-instances of Cartesians who 
preached kindness to animals.4 Moreover, for this 
argument to work, it would have to be shown that 
Cartesians pursued animal experimentation with more 
vigour and cruelty than did their non-Cartesian 
counterparts. To my knowledge, no one has established 
this. Indeed it would be surprising if they could, for in 
the seventeenth century it was simply not necessary to 
go to the extent of denying that animals felt pain in 
order to justify experimenting on them. Whether 
animals felt pain or not was irrelevant, given the almost 
universal belief that animals had been placed in the 
world for the service of mankind. It was this view, 
combined with the Baconian understanding of nature, 
which informed the practice of vivisection. Only with 
the advent of Bentham's utilitarianism did the purported 
capacity of animals to feel pain become morally 
significant. Again, it is clear that one's treatment of 
animals need not be determined solely, if at all, by 
whether they are capable of feeling pain. 
2. Mental States and 
the Relevance of Physical Similarities 
We now tum to my apparent covert commitment to 
Cartesian dualism. This is ascribed to me on the basis 
of examples put forward to show that pain is a mental 
state (a claim which, I confess, could have been stated 
more explicitly, but which should not be confused with 
another which Professor Pluhar erroneously attributes 
to me, that pain is "primarily psychological," whatever 
that means). There are few, if any, philosophers who 
would contest this assertion. What is at issue is the 
relation between such mentalistic statements as "I am 
in pain" and physicalistic statements of the kind "X's 
nervous system is presently in such and such a physical 
state." My position with respect to the relation of the 
mental and the physical is indeed dualist, but one may 
be a dualist without subscribing to Descartes' ontology 
ofdual substances. Leibniz isa case in point, and some 
would argue that epiphenomalists are dualists of a kind. 
There are, in addition, a number of modem versions of 
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dualism which differ from the classical formulation of 
Descartes.s "Dualists" in this context are simply those 
who consider propositions about mental states to differ 
from propositions about physical states in terms of both 
meaning and reference. Admittedly, dualism, Cartesian 
or otherwise, does have difficulties, but in my view these 
are less intractable than those of alternative theories of 
mind. In any case, arguments that animals are not 
subjects of such mental states as pain do not necessarily 
rely upon a dualist theory of mind. As Pluhar herself 
indicates, earlier this century it was actually opponents 
of dualism who, influenced by linguistic philosophy, 
challenged the meaningfulness of all mentalistic 
statements. In view of this confusion it might be worth 
sorting out some of the implications of various theories 
of mind, particularly with respect to the argument from 
physiological similarities. 
It seems to me that the most a dualist can say is that 
under specific conditions, certain neurological 
structures seem necessary for mental events of certain 
kinds.6 (I mearrempirically necessary, not logically 
necessary.) To make the much more difficult case that 
the same neurological structures are sufficient for mental 
experiences, we need to subscribe to some theory of 
mind according to which, in principle, all propositions 
about mental events are logically deducible, or 
empirically discoverable, from propositions about 
physical states.7 A materialistic theory of mind, 
according to which mental states are nothing but 
physical states of the brain, would be most suitable. 
However, even if some form of physicalism is correct, 
and if, through some unimaginable scientific 
breakthrough, we are able to infer mental states from 
physical states, it may still tum out that the subjective 
experience of pain in one human individual may turn 
out to be represented by a different physical state from 
that which obtains in another human being experiencing 
pain. Thus no amount of knowledge of brain states 
would ever shed light on mental states. But further, even 
granting all of these "ifs," we would never be in a 
position to know what an animal's mental states were, 
because despite the most complete knowledge of their 
physical states, given that their nervous systems differ 
from ours in significant ways, and given that we have 
no independent access to their mental states (assuming 
they have them), we would have no way of constructing 
the hypothetical map which would allow us to read off 
mental state from physical state. Thus even the theory 
ofmind which most favours the view that the similarity 
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of animals' neural structures to our own is a relevant 
consideration in detennining whether they feel pain, 
must be supplemented with additional assumptions. 
When we turn to those psychologists whose research 
apparently involves "the induction of grief, anxiety, 
anguish and psycho~is in nonhumans," the relevance 
of our discussion of alternative views of mind becomes 
apparent. It is clear that some materialistic theory of 
mind is often tacitly, and hence uncritically, accepted 
by the scientific fraternity. Symptomatic of its influence 
is an increasing tendency in psychology to convert 
mental criteria into physical criteria. Physical criteria 
can be measured and manipulated in a way that mental 
criteria cannot, and physical criteria yield "objective" 
knowledge. A classic case is the treatment ofdreaming 
in psychological literature. The sole criterion for the 
occurrence of a dream is a waking report. However, 
some psychologists, attempting to establish links 
between measurable physical states and reports of 
dreams, have tended to displace the mental criterion in 
favour of some physical criterion, in this case, a period 
of rapid eye movement (REM). But as Nonnan 
Malcolm has ably demonstrated, however interesting 
the correlations between these physical events and 
subjects' reports of dreams, such connexions can only 
be established by continual reference to the original, 
mental criterion of dreaming.s The illicit substitution 
of "period of REM sleep" for "dream" leads psychol-
ogists into a discussion of some phenomenon which 
only indirectly pertains to what we routinely refer to as 
"dreaming." The criterion of "dreaming" as we 
commonly use the tenn, is emphatically not some 
measurable physiological state, however convenient this 
latter characterisation might be for psychologists. 
In animal psychology the tendency to make these 
kinds of illicit substitutions is endemic. Hence, as 
Pluhar has indicated, we find such labels as "grief," 
"anxiety," "anguish," and "psychosis" applied to 
animals. However, the criteria for the use of these 
tenns are not, as in the case of human use, reports of 
mental state but, rather, particular physical syndromes 
which correspond roughly to those physical states of 
human beings who make reports of the psychological 
phenomena concerned. These subtle substitutions can 
only be meaningful if their reference is restricted to 
those physical characteristics which serve as criteria 
for their application or if the standard use of the terms 
as applied to humans is altered so that these tenns refer 
not to mental states but to other physical criteria 
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thought to correlate with those states. Either way, the 
use of such tenns sheds no light on the mental lives of 
nonhumans and is at best highly equivocal, at worst, 
hopelessly mUddled. 
The whole body of "respectable evidence" to the 
effect that animals make "choices," incidentally, is 
predicated upon a similar linguistic confusion.9 
In the light of this discussion, we can return to what 
prompted the charge of Cartesian dualism-my 
discussion of the psychology of pain. Reference was 
made to this literature to illustrate one simple principle: 
if two human individuals, who presumably have very 
similar neural structures, experience the same painful 
stimulus in different ways, the subjective experience 
ofpain is simply not a direct function of neuroanatomy. 
(Aristotle, Spinoza and Ryle, incidentally, would hardly 
have supported my general position. Ryle, in particular, 
was a notorious anti-dualist. These philosophers were 
cited merely to show there is general agreement that 
pain is not a sensation.) 
To conclude this discussion of the relevance of 
physical affinities, let me make it clear that I do not 
deny the significance of "the neurophysiological 
similarity of human and nonhuman species." This 
similarity, however, can admit of two quite distinct 
interpretations. I welcome Pluhar's announcement that 
we have 98.4% of genetic material in common with 
chimpanzees (although the statistic is somewhat 
misleading).l0 We can add to this the observation of 
Sir John Eccles that "in the [human] neocortex no 
special structural or physiological properties have been 
identified that distinguish sharply a human brain from 
the brain of an anthropoid ape."ll What these 
similarities demonstrate is that the achievements of 
human consciousness are vastly disproportionate to 
the neurological differences which exist between 
ourselves and our nearest relatives. We do not 
characteristically observe our simian cousins 
producing works of art, writing literature, composing 
music, or building cities, which are, on average, 98.4% 
as good as ours. There is in the animal world nothing 
to compare with the products of the conscious mind, 
however much evolutionary biologists want to stress 
the continuities between human and animal species. 
(Chimpanzees' constructions of two- and three-term 
expressions in ASL do not, in my view, compare 
favourably with the works of Shakespeare.)l 2 Nor need 
we be committed to any particular theory of mind to 
see the force of this disproportion. We may, like 
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Descartes, postulate the existence of some spiritual 
substance which, allied to the human brain, accounts 
for the difference. Alternatively, we may want to argue 
that the unique products of human culture are direct 
functions of very small brain differences. But even if 
we adopt this second view, we are admitting that the 
relevant statistic is not 98.4% similarity, but the 1.6% 
difference. There simply is no proportionality between 
physical and mental worlds. 
3. Sensation and Consciousness 
In the final section of my paper I am alleged to 
have made a "stunning turn," conceding that 
nonhumans can experience pain. At least I am in 
illustrious company, for Descartes and I stand jointly 
charged with wanting to have it both ways, in that we 
are supposed to have asserted both that animals are 
not conscious and that they are capable of having 
sensations. The difficulty here is that words like 
"sensation" carry with them what Wittgenstein called 
"grammatical illusions"-in this case the belief that 
all sensation is conscious. (We have already witnessed 
this in the parallel instances of animal "anxiety," 
"grief," etc.) As Descartes himselfwas at pains to point 
out, albeit in vain, sensations need not be conscious. I3 
Animals, in his view, have sensations, but they are 
not aware of them. There is no ambiguity here, it is 
simply a matter of attending closely to how these 
words are used. (Leibniz's "apperception" was an 
attempt to avoid the misunderstanding engendered by 
the use of "sensation.")14 The point I am making, at 
any rate, is not, as Pluhar erroneously believes, that 
animals experience genuine pains and then forget them 
but, rather, that animals lack the self-conscious identity 
which is a prerequisite for conscious experience. The 
sentence which is cited in support of my stunning 
turn-"I am not implying here that painful experiences 
which are forgotten were never painful to start with"-
refers only to human experience, as should be clear 
from the original context. 
Pluhar has placed a similarly unfortunate con-
struction on my argument concerning learning in 
Protozoa. My observations about Protozoan habituation 
were to illustrate the principle that learning does not 
require consciousness, not that all learning was of the 
simple Protozoan kind. Rather than multiply examples 
beyond necessity, let me simply cite another author on 
this question: 
On its own, the behavioural evidence is 
ambiguous, since persistence of a response 
after the stimulus has ended, memory, 
anticipation and learning are readily explained 
in terms of simple neural mechanisms which 
do not require the postUlation of any form of 
subjective experience on the part of the 
animal.I5 
4. Free WiD and Determinism 
To holding "the undefended assumption that the 
capacity to choose is incompatible with the deterministic 
thesis," I plead guilty. I also concede that the classic 
problem faced by incompatibilists, like myself, is "how 
to construe an uncaused choice in a meaningful way." 
The classic counter is, of course, that free agents are 
the causes of their own actions. The problem offreedom 
and determinism, like the mind-body problem, is not 
one which I claim to have solved. All I have done is to 
opt for a philosophically-defensible thesis of human 
freedom which is consistent with my overall position.I6 
For the benefit of those who, with Professor Pluhar, 
believe that an action can be both determined and freely 
chosen, let me rephrase the argument which links pain 
and choice: If animal behaviour is externally caused 
(i.e., not caused by animals acting as agents), then we 
have some good reasons for thinking that animals do 
not suffer pain. Despite Pluhar's claim to the contrary, 
this is not an instance of attempting to prove a thesis by 
appealing to its premisesP The only genuine ground 
for complaint is the "if' used in the formulation of this 
argument. IfPluhar can show that my view offree-will 
is wrong, then the argument fails. But while 
incompatibilism of the kind outlined above continues 
to be a serious philosophical option (although, as I 
conceded in the original paper, not an uncontroversial 
one), my case remains plausible. 
5. The Relevance of Evolutionary Theory 
Professor Pluhar is quite justified in chastising me 
for having given a rather simple account of natural 
selection. Indeed, my own case assumes the more 
sophisticated version which she presents. Yes, it is true 
that not every trait of every species confers some kind 
of selective advantage. Accordingly, when Pluhar states 
that it is "simply false to say that debilitating pain, 
depression, anxiety, etc., do not threaten our survival," 
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I am in full agreement with her. My point is that the 
human species has something which compensates for 
this-namely, a culture which insulates us from 
selection pressures which might otherwise lead to our 
demise. Culture enables us to "carry" these, and perhaps 
other, negative traits.. It seems less likely that animals, 
who do not enjoy the benefit of this cultural buffer, would 
be able to perpetuate similar disadvantageous traits. 
It must also be pointed out that while evolutionary 
theory might in principle allow for the fact that some 
traits confer no selective advantage, it is not clear, in 
practice, when evolutionary biologists would be 
justified in abandoning the search for such explanations, 
for a researcher could never be in a position to 
distinguish between a trait which conferred an as yet 
unknown selective advantage, and one which was 
simply not advantageous. We can see the strength of 
this if we consider the example provided by Pluhar-
the behaviour of a cat or dog which ceases to eat on the 
death of a companion. It might reasonably be argued 
that one half of a superannuated breeding pair is no 
longer in a position to enhance the survival of the 
species. On the contrary, having fulfilled its 
reproductive function, it is now competing for food 
resources with other pairs which have reproductive 
potential. Not eating in this situation turns out to be 
advantageous to the species. Now, it does not really 
matter whether this account works or not. The point is 
that such behaviour is not intrinsically "mysterious" to 
those who deny that animals have subjective states 
analogous to human grief, because there will always 
be the possibility of some such overlooked explanation. 
Professor Pluhar might respond at this juncture with 
the cry of "false dilemma." This "grieving" behaviour, 
she might point out, is both adaptive and indicative of 
mental grief. Rather than trump the false dilemma with 
Occam's razor, let me just point out that to introduce 
mentalistic explanations is immediately to move beyond 
the bounds of evolutionary theory, for it is behaviours, 
not mental stites, which adapt, and it is only physical 
entities which can be the subjects of natural selection. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, I wish to offer some brief comments 
on Pluhar's final verdict on my argument. In her 
judgement, it consists of "a series of inadequately 
supported statements, hasty generalisations, and 
question-begging assumptions." I'm not sure about the 
hasty generalisations, but the remarks about the 
"inadequately supported statements" and the "question-
begging assumptions" are revealing. On the first head, 
there were, indeed, a number of inadequately supported 
statements in my piece. This does not mean that they 
are insupportable. My views on the nature of free will, 
for example, were not supported, but the running in 
this department has been made by others. The same 
applies to my assumptions about the nature of mind. 
The important thing in these cases is that arguments 
are available. Moreover, in the construction of a 
plausible argument-which is all I have claimed for 
my case-it is perfectly legitimate to make assumptions, 
provided that they are not clearly false. A critic must 
show that such assumptions are erroneous, not merely 
contentious. While Professor Pluhar has competently 
rehearsed some standard objections to a number of my 
assumptions, she has not shown any of them to be false. 
On the second head, Pluhar seems to confuse the 
demonstration of the consistency of a position with 
begging the question. My argument functions in part 
by showing that if we take a certain position with respect 
to (say) free will, and add to this a commitment to a 
particular philosophy of mind, we may be led to certain 
remarkable conclusions about animal consciousness. 
These, in tum, may mesh neatly with a certain type of 
theodicy. The fact that these positions are mutually 
supportive actually strengthens the argument.It follows 
that an effective criticism would have to demonstrate 
that (a) my premises are false, or (b) the implications I 
have drawn from those premises are false, or (c) the 
various philosophical positions which serve as my 
premises are inconsistent with each other. Professor 
Pluhar has failed on each of these counts. 
Notes 
I This not least because, as Hume famously pointed out, 
no "ought" is deducible from an "is." 
2 Philosophers as divergent as Aquinas and Kant denied 
the relevance of animal pain, while insisting at the same time 
that we ought to refrain from cruelty to animals. More recently, 
some writers on animal welfare have avoided references to 
pain in the search for more objective criteria to inform the 
treatment of animals. See, e.g., D.M. Broom, "Indicators of 
Poor Welfare," British Veterinary Joumal142 (1986) 524f. 
For a brief statement ·of the kinds of moral considerations 
which I consider to be relevant to our treatmentof nonhuman 
animals, see Peter Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain? ," 
Philosophy 66 (1991) 25-40, part v; cf. Patrick Bateson, 
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"Assessment of Pain in Animals," Animal Behaviour 42 
(1991) 827-39, p. 836. 
The utilitarian approach, in any case, suffers from other 
embarrassments. While there is doubt about animals' 
subjective experiences of pain, there must be doubt about how 
they ought to be treated. Moreover, utilitarianism leads to a 
conflict of positive duties toward animals: Do we save the 
bird from the cat? For a systematic account of the limitations 
of a utilitarian approach to the issue, and of some of the 
implications of a contractualist ethics, see Peter Camithers, 
The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Prcu:tice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
3 The standard sources are Joseph Lavalk, Letters of a 
Marmeluke (London, 1804), p. 106; N. Trublet, Memoirs pour 
selVir d I'histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de M. de Fontenelle 
(Amsterdam: Mrac-Michel Rey, 1761), p. US. Nicholas 
Fontaine also wrote of Cartesians who justified vivisection 
by claiming that animals did not feel pain: see L. Rosenfield, 
From Beast-Mcu:hine to Man-Mcu:hine, (New York: Octagon, 
1968), p. 54. 
4 See, e.g., John Norris, Essay Towards the Theory ofthe 
Ideal or Intelligible World (London: Pr. for S. Manship, 1704), 
pp. 59,100. Also Louis Racine, cited in Rosenfield, Beast-
Mcu:hine to Man-Machine, p. 53. 
5 For some modem versions of dualism, see The Case 
For Dualism, ed. J. Smythies and 1. Beloff (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1989). 
6 Even this may be doubtful. We would generally say, for 
example, that a striate cortex is necessary for conscious visual 
experiences. However, some human individuals seem to be 
able to see without one. See David Paterson, "Is Your Brain 
Really Necessary?," World Medicine 3, May, 1980,21-4. The 
argument that certain neural structures are at least sufficient 
for certain conscious experiences would, in any case, only 
apply to human mental states. The brains of birds, for example, 
also lack a striate cortex, despite behaviour which suggests 
that they have visual experiences. I should add that some 
dualists believe in the possibility of disembodied existence. 
Under these conditions, obviously no physical state would 
be a necessary condition of a mental state. 
7 Epiphenomenalists would also accept this, but in my 
view the position ofepiphenomenalism is neutral with respect 
to arguments about animals' consciousness. 
8 See Norman Malcolm, Dreaming (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1959), ch. 13. 
<} I should point out that I do not deny the heuristic value 
of these locutions. For many reasons, both practical and 
scientific, it might be helpful to speak of animals as if they 
were subjects of mental states. But we ought not confuse the 
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heuristic value of such expressions with their truth. Of course, 
some might wish to argue that, for example, measures of 
"stress" (qua physical phenomenon) should inform our 
treatment of animals. This is fine as far as it goes, but such 
arguments could not be justified by the further claim that 
"stress" is an index of pain. 
10 A significant amount of our DNA seems to play no 
active role in genetic specification. 
II John Eccles, The Hwnan Mystery (Berlin: Springer, 
1979), p. 234. 
12 It is not entirely clear to me why Pluhar has taken my 
ironic reference to chimpanzees and ASL as some kind of 
shameful admission. I can only assume that she has 
misunderstood the language criterion for consciousness. At 
this point, the only claim I will make for language use is that 
it is a dramatic example of the discontinuity between humans 
and other animals. 
13 See Peter Harrison, "Descartes on Animals," The 
Philosophical Quarlerly 42 (1992) 219-27. Peter Carruthers 
makes the same point with his notion of "nonconscious 
experience." 
14 Leibniz, incidentally, for a time a least, shared Descartes' 
views about animal consciousness. Discourse on Metaphysics, 
XXXN, tr. George Montgomery (Chicago: Open Court, 1902); 
cf. Correspondence with Arnauld, in Ibid., pp. 156, 220. 
15 Patrick Bateson, "Assessment ofPain in Animals," 834. 
16 The standard defence of self-determinism was provided 
by Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (New 
York: Garland, 1977). For a more recent discussion seeAgency 
and Necessity, ed. A. Flew and G. Vesey (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1987). 
17 Pluhar makes this complaint because she confuses the 
logical relations which obtain between three distinct 
propositions: (I)X is a machine, (2) X cannot feel pain, (3)The 
behaviour of X is externally determined. On these relations 
see John Cottingham, .. 'A Brute to the Brutes?': Descartes' 
Treatment of Animals," Philosophy 53 (1971) 551-61. 
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